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During the period 16-19 September 2004, the 16th Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 4th Plenary Session, 
which was attended by 198 full members and 158 alternate members. 
At this meeting it was decided that Jiang Zemin, 78, would step down 
as Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) to be followed 
by President and General Secretary Hu Jintao, 61. By this change of 
guard, the transition from the so-called third generation to the fourth 
generation of Chinese leaders was completed.
During the weeks leading up to this important meeting of the Central 
Committee there was intense speculation in Western news media that a 
power struggle was waging in the upper echelons of the CCP (Forney 
2004; Kahn 2004). Apparently, Jiang Zemin was advancing all kinds of 
preconditions for stepping down, effectively making it impossible to 
reach a resolution of the succession issue. It was also rumoured that if 
Jiang  were to step down, he would make sure that his right-hand man 
and close ally Vice-President Zeng Qinghong would be appointed vice-
chairman of the CMC, so that Hu Jintao's power would effectively be 
counterweighted. However, Jiang stepped down in an orderly fashion 
and Zeng Qinghong was not appointed vice-chairman. Instead a mili-
tary man, Xu Caihou, took up the post. Furthermore, Admiral Zhang 
Dingfa and Generals Chen Bingde, Qiao Qingchen and Jing Zhiyuan 
were promoted to the CMC, so that the top military organ now has 11 
members compared to 8 under Jiang. In sum, new leaders were once 
again elected without drama and apparent in-fighting. Thus the impres-
sion that Chinese politics has entered a stable new phase of predictable 
institutionalization has been further strengthened (Brødsgaard 2003).
There are several reasons why Jiang Zemin decided to step down. 
Hu Jintao has by now clearly consolidated his power in the Party. There 
has been much speculation that his manoeuvrability in the Politburo 
standing committee was restricted by the presence of a majority of Jiang 
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supporters in this top policy-making organ. However, all the indica-
tions are that Hu in fact commands a majority in the Politburo and is 
not encountering any strong opposition. He may now feel he is ready 
to assume the leadership of the army and, faced with such a situation, 
Jiang decided to bow to the new top man. Secondly, Jiang did not have 
much to gain by staying on. Many Chinese believe that he has already 
overstayed his role and that if he were to cling to power, this would ef-
fectively damage Jiang's legacy. Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, 
during the recent commemorations of the 100th anniversary of the birth 
of Deng Xiaoping, CCP leaders praised Deng for having given up his 
party and military positions before he died in 1997 (China aktuell 2004). 
Hu said at the meeting that Deng, by abolishing life-long tenure for offi-
cials and leaders, had set a personal example. In fact, Deng stepped down 
as member of the Politburo in 1987 and retired from the chairmanship 
of the CMC two years later (November 1989). Even if he had wanted to, 
it would had been extremely difficult for Jiang Zemin to ignore Deng's 
example. Therefore since Jiang retired from the Politburo in September 
2002, he was bound to fully step down two years later. Deng's legacy 
still looms large in China and to ignore it would not be possible. 
This is not to say that Jiang will not continue to wield influence in 
both the Party and the military. He clearly will do so, although he is now 
fully retired. He was party leader for 13 years during a crucial period 
of the Chinese reform process and this alone gives him considerable 
influence. As to the military, Jiang has appointed 79 full generals dur-
ing his tenure as chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) 
and many of these generals owe him their thanks if not their loyalty. 
However, Jiang did not manage to have his close ally, Vice-President 
Zeng Qinghong appointed to the CMC, which implies either that he 
stepped down without any preconditions or that Hu Jintao was strong 
enough to block the appointment in order not to have his power within 
the CMC curbed.
The new CMC consists of the following members: General Secretary 
Hu Jintao is chairman, while Minister of Defence Cao Guangchuan, 
former Executive Chief of Staff of PLA Guo Boxiong, and Director of 
the Political Department of the PLA Xu Caihou serve as the three vice-
chairmen. Chief of General Staff Liang Guanglie, Director of the General 
Armament Department Li Jinai and Director of the General Logistics 
Department Liao Xilong have all served as ordinary members since 
2002. They have now been joined by the commanders of the Navy, Air 
Force, and PLA Second Artillery, namely Admiral Zhang Dingfa and 
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Generals Qiao Qingchen and Jing Zhiyuan. Finally the commander of 
the Jinan Military Region, Chen Bingde, has been elevated to the Central 
Military Commission (see Table 1).
TABLE 1: Composition of the Central Military Commission (CMC) 
Elected at the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th CC of the CCP
Name Position
Hu Jintao Chairman of the CMC, General Secretary of the CCP, Presi-
dent of the PRC 
Cao Guangchuan Vice-Chairman of the CMC, Defence Minister, Member of 
Politburo
Guo Boxiong Vice-Chairman of CMC, Member of Politburo
Xu Caihou Vice-Chairman of the CMS, Director of the General Political 
Dept. of the PLA
Liang Guanglie Member of the CMC, Chief of General Staff
Li Jinai Member of the CMC, Director of General Armaments De-
partment
Liao Xilong Member of the CMC, Director of the General Logistics De-
partment
Chen Bingde Member of the CMC, Commander of Jinan Military Region
Qiao Qingchen Member of the CMC, Commander of PLA Air Force
Zhang Dingfa Member of the CMC, Commander of PLA Navy
Jiang Zhiyuan Member of the CMC, Commander of PLA Second Artillery
Sources: China aktuell (August 2004); Beijing Review.
The new line-up of the CMC includes only one civilian, namely Hu 
Jintao, and seems to reflect a trend of combat readiness in Zhongnanhai, 
the central power centre in Beijing. Jing Zhiyuan is as Commander of 
the PLA Second Artillery in charge of China's missile forces. His ap-
pointment brings the technologically advanced part of the PLA into the 
CMC. Chen Bingde is former head of the Nanjing Military Region, a 
crucial region in Beijing's military strategy versus Taiwan, and his ap-
pointment to the CMC strengthens the perception of urgency in dealing 
with the Taiwan question. In short, the new line-up by integrating navy, 
air, army and the missile forces plus the important Jinan and Beijing 
Military Regions, will facilitate the preparation and consolidation of the 
military option vis-à-vis the Taiwan issue, in the eventuality that cross-
straits relations deteriorate beyond a diplomatic solution.
This is not to say that there will necessarily be a change in mainland 
China's Taiwan policy. There has been speculation that Hu will be more 
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flexible and accommodating in his stance on the Taiwan issue. However, 
it is difficult to substantiate any disagreements between Hu and Jiang on 
this issue. In the event that policies should shift, this is likely to be the 
outcome of changing circumstances rather than differences in opinion 
among the various factions of the military and political leadership.
Jiang's Legacy
Jiang Zemin led China during a particularly difficult period. When he as-
sumed power in June 1989, China was in the middle of a deep crisis. The 
crackdown on the students on 4 June had created deep internal division, 
aggravated by the sanctions that the US and the EU quickly introduced. 
Many scholars predicted that the days of the CCP were numbered and 
that there would be a change of regime. Such expectations were further 
strengthened as a consequence of the collapse of communism in the So-
viet Union and in Eastern Europe during 1989-91. Jiang had been selected 
by Deng and a gerontocratic group of the so-called 'eight immortals' as 
new CCP leader in the summer of 1989 on the premise that he would 
continue to push for economic reform. When he hesitated to live up to 
his promise, Deng reportedly was ready to topple him, just as he had 
done to Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang when they did not live up to his 
expectations. However, Jiang was able to adjust and from 1992 reform 
and an 'opening-up' policy again took centre-stage in China. That he 
was able to extricate himself successfully from the emerging leadership 
crisis in 1992 shows his great pragmatism and ability to manoeuvre po-
litically. During the remaining part of the 1990s, Jiang continued to lead 
China down the path of rapid economic growth. This Wirtschaftwunder 
combined with a foreign policy of 'big power diplomacy' fundamentally 
strengthened China's international standing.
By the turn of the century, China enjoyed a stronger position on the 
world stage than it had ever held since 1949. It had restarted economic 
growth in the wake of the Tiananmen débâcle, dramatically expanded 
foreign trade, and boosted the absorption of foreign direct investment. 
It had restored relations with those same Western countries that had 
imposed sanctions in 1989. China now holds regular summits with the 
US, is invited to meetings in the G7 group and has been admitted to the 
WTO. It has won back Hong Kong and Macau and has been selected to 
host the 2008 Olympics, against fierce international competition (Nathan 
2003). In short, China's prestige, standing and influence have by any 
measure increased immensely during Jiang Zemin's rule. 
In 2000, as Jiang was approaching the end of his tenure as China's 
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supreme leader, he advanced the theory of 'the Three Represents' (sange 
daibiao). This theory paved the way for the ideological emancipation of 
the private entrepreneurs and made it possible to invite 'these advanced 
elements' of the new economy to join the CCP (Holbig 2002). Sange daibiao 
has been included in the constitution of the PRC and will be regarded 
as Jiang's theoretical legacy.
However, Jiang Zemin is not Deng Xiaoping and does not enjoy the 
same status as Deng, who never needed to hold the formal top position 
in the party or state apparatus in order to wield supreme power. There-
fore he will not enjoy the same influence in his retirement as Deng did. 
Furthermore, there does not seem to be a Politburo decision in place, 
as there was in 1987, to give the retired leader the right to intervene or 
to be heard in major decisions.
Consequently the new leader Hu Jintao will have a freer hand in 
leading China than Jiang had when he took over. The basic line of in-
cremental reform will probably remain unchanged, but already there 
are indications that the Shanghai and the Eastern provinces will receive 
relatively less attention. Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have already 
indicated that they are leaning toward more redistributionist policies in 
order to reduce the immense inequalities that exist between Eastern and 
Western provinces and between rural and urban China. Such a change 
in the central leadership's attention will shift the focus away from the 
Shanghai area to the benefit of Northern China. 
The CCP's Capacity to Govern
Apart from announcing the formal retirement of Jiang Zemin, one of 
the most important decisions taken at the recent 4th Plenary Session of 
the Central Committee of the CCP was about strengthening the Party's 
governing capacity (zhizheng nengli). 
The Hu Jintao leadership appears to be convinced that China's future 
economic development and reform depend on creating a strong govern-
ment that is competent and professional. The SARS crisis in the spring 
and early summer of 2003 demonstrated a lack of capacity on the part 
of the government to handle complex new situations. The ensuing crisis 
challenged the authority of the new leadership and damaged China's 
international standing. The CCP leadership under Hu will do its utmost 
to make sure that a similar situation of confusion in the governing bod-
ies does not happen again. Therefore there will be a focus on creating a 
more efficient and responsive government. Since the government and 
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its civil servants are controlled by the CCP, it is ultimately a question 
of strengthening the Party's capacity to govern effectively.
Over the past couple of years the CCP has published six major docu-
ments to reform and regularize cadre supervision and discipline and 
to routinize promotions of civil servants. These documents include the 
2002 Regulations on Selection and Appointment of Party and Government 
Leading Cadres (Regulations 2002), the recently promulgated Regulations 
of the CPC on Internal Supervision (Trial Implementation) and the Regu-
lations of the CPC on Disciplinary Penalties. Moreover, there has been a 
sustained effort to professionalize the work of Party and state cadres. 
Part of these efforts has been to introduce educational and age criteria 
for cadre promotion (Brødsgaard 2004).
However, a recent survey conducted by the Central Party School 
among cadres at county level and above indicates that many leading 
cadres lack the ability to lead and govern. According to the survey, 58 
percent demonstrated a lack of ability to 'make a scientific judgment of 
a situation', while more than one-third either 'had difficulty tackling a 
complicated situation' or 'totally lost their heads' in such a situation. The 
widespread public panic during the early stages of the SARS outbreak in 
the spring of 2003 was an example of the lack of government capability 
to handle an emergency situation (Ni 2004).
The 'Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China on Strengthening the Party's Governing Capacity' (Decision 2004), 
adopted by the 4th Plenary Session on 16 September 2004, shows that the 
CCP leadership is firmly committed to strengthening governance and 
leadership. This will be done by focusing on Party renewal and Party 
adaptation to the new economic and social imperatives in China today. 
The Hu Jintao leadership understands political reform as a reform of 
the political system, not as basic political and social changes. Political 
reform in Hu's China is not about the introduction of a Western form of 
democracy, because this would essentially mean sharing power with, 
or eventually ceding power to, other groups of political contenders. The 
new leadership is not prepared to accept such a scenario.
Conclusion
The recent 4th Plenary Session shows that the institutionalization of Chi-
nese politics is continuing in a routine and stable manner. The transition 
to a new leadership has for the first time been completed in a peaceful 
and orderly fashion in conformity with agreed norms and rules. The 
new leadership is eager to carry out this process of institutionalization 
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and normativization at all levels of the Chinese bureaucracy. In fact, they 
believe that the success of this process will ultimately decide whether 
the present political system – with its inherent control and domination 
by the CCP – will continue to have a future.
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard is Professor and Director of the Asia Research Centre, 
Copenhagen Business School.
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